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FACTS DISPUTED FROM APPELLEE'S
"STATEMENT OF FACTS UNDER LYING THE ORIGINAL SUIT."
The following numbered facts of appellee Norton are either
disputed or misleading.
7.

This fact infers that "NSI selected" a container that was

especially designed for it.

In fact, NSI ordered one of a number

of standard models of complete containers which were designed and
manufactured by Norton, and offered for sale,

11.

This fact infers that the soap which NSI placed in the

container created pressure inside the can.

That is not accurate.

Dr. Noel De Nevers' affidavit filed in the present law suit makes
it clear that the container was pressurized by moving the sealed
container from an area of high atmospheric pressure (low altitude
on the coast of California) to an area of low atmospheric pressure
(due to high altitude in Salt Lake City) .
created by the soap.

The pressure was not

The same pressure would have been created had

the container been filled with water or even if it were empty.
(See Affidavit of Dr. Noel De Nevers in this case, Addendum 1)
14.

Norton quotes from Dr. De Nevers' deposition in the prior

case and complains that he never said the product was "defective."
In Dr. De Nevers' affidavit he stated that w . . . a container which
allows the seal to be propelled at these speeds
because

of

normal

altitude

and

temperature

[30 to 160 mph]

differences

which

regularly occur during normal shipping is unreasonably dangerous."
(See Affidavit of Dr. Noel De Nevers, Addendum 1)

2

SUMMARY JUDGMENT INDEMNITY CLAIMS
POINT I:

RES JUDICATA APPLIES WHEN CLAIMS ARE "FAIRLY AND FULLY
LITIGATED" BETWEEN PARTIES, NOT WHEN THERE IS "NO
STANDING" TO LITIGATE BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

Appellee Norton argues that the claims for indemnity ". . .
have already been briefed, argued, and litigated between NSI and
Norton and determined as a matter of law. . ." because of the prior
lower court's ruling granting summary judgement several years ago.
Norton quotes from that summary judgement to show some of the
arguments were similar.

(Norton brief, p 23 -

25.)

A. There was no prior lawsuit between NSI and Norton.
NSI never filed a claim of any kind against Norton in the
prior lawsuit between Packer and Norton.
a cross-claim,

Because NSI did not file

the prior appellate court did not review NSI's

arguments, and held that

, without a cross-claim, NSI had no

standing to even resist the summary judgment between Packer and
Norton.

Thus the prior lawsuit involved Packer, not NSI.

The

prior case was not "fully and fairly litigated" as required by res
judicata.

NSI and Norton were not even adversaries, as the court

ruled.

3

B.

Norton ignores the law cited by NSI# and cites no additional

authority.

NSI cited Salt

Lake City v. Silver

(Ut. 1995) in its original brief.

Fork Pipeline,

Norton never addressed that

case, or any other case on res judicata.
dispositive.

913 P. 2d 731

The Silver

Fork

case is

"The rendition of a judgment in an action does not

conclude parties to the action who are not adversaries under the
pleadings as to their rights . . . "

(emphasis added) Id.

quoting Restatement

The former appellate

of Judgments.

at 733,
court

specifically found that " Neither NSI nor Norton filed cross-claims

against each other."

Packer

v. National

Service

Industries,

909

P. 2d 1277 (Utah App. 1996) . Norton ignores the case law, evidently
hoping this court will ignore the law also.
C.

The Packer lawsuit contained no claim of indemnification.
The lawsuit between Packer and Norton contained no claims for

indemnification.

NSI's

claim for indemnification has never been

litigated, and res judicata is simply not applicable.

The lower

court granted summary judgment only because the prior appellate
court had not yet ruled, and the lower court stated". . .1 don't
buy into the argument that you don't . . .have standing, I just

4

don't, I think you do. . ." R. p. 218, 1. 10-12.

The appellate

court ruled otherwise, and the lower court turn out to be wrong.
The

summary

judgment

based

on

the

wrong

assumption

must

be

overturned.
D.

Conclusion.
Norton simply ignores the appellate court's ruling when it

doesn't fit its purpose.
M

ruled

.

In fact the appellate court specifically

. . because NSI did not have a right to respond to

Norton's motion for summary judgement against the plaintiff, NSI
has no right to appeal the court's order granting Norton's motion".
Packer

at 1278.

Norton obtained summary judgement only against

the plaintiff, because plaintiff declined to resist the motion.
NSI and Norton had no standing to even litigate claims against each
other

because

neither

filed

cross

indemnity claims were even involved.

claims.

Additionally,

no

In fact, the former appellate

court specifically ruled Norton could file an indemnity claim.
"NSI

could

also protect

any possible

claim against

finding an independent action claim in indemnity
1211.

Norton by

. . ." Id.

at

This claim must be reinstated, as the former appellate court

ruled.

5

Norton argued to the former appellate court, successfully,
that NSI had no standing to resist its motion for summary judgment.
It must now live with that ruling.
been entered.

No judgement on the merits has

No claim was even filed between the two parties.

No

"full and fair opportunity" to litigate the claims has occurred.
Res judicata is simply inapplicable.

Norton cites no case law

because there is no support for its fallacious argument.

POINT II: "COMPARATIVE IMPLIED INDEMNITY"
LEGISLATURE'S INTENT THAT EACH
PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF FAULT.

REFLECTS THE UTAH
PARTY PAY ITS OWN

Norton argues that this court adopting "comparative implied
indemnity" "would not affect the outcome of this case" and "would
be barred by res judicata in any case" Norton brief page 19.
Norton's

claims are simply without

foundation.

As previously

pointed out, the appellate court specifically ruled that "NSI could
also

protect

a

possible

claim

against

Norton

independent action claiming indemnity . . . " Packer

by

filing

an

Supra 1278.

"Comparative implied indemnity" would affect the outcome of
this case if NSI were anywhere between one and ninety-nine percent
liable

for this incident.

The only time

6

"comparative

implied

indemnity" would not affect the outcome of the case is if NSI were
100% liable (there could be no recovery from Norton) or Norton were
100% liable (NSI would receive a full recovery).
Norton hopes to abrogate the Utah Legislature's intent that
each

party

pay

its proportionate

share

since,

under

the

old

indemnity law (adopted before the Tort Reform Statute) if Norton
can show that NSI was only 1% liable the old law would not require
Norton to pay for its 99% fault.

The Tort Reform Statute made

clear that result is inequitable and not acceptable.
should

adopt

"comparative

implied

indemnity"

so

This court

if Norton

is

determined anywhere between 1% and 99% at fault, that Norton pay
its proportionate share of fault.
100% liable and the other 0% liable.

Very few cases find one party
Based purely on percentages,

in 99 out of 100 cases, this court's adoption of
implied

indemnity"

would

affect

the

outcome

of

"comparative
the

case.

Additionally it will give full effect to the legislative intent
that Norton pay its own fair share of liability.

7

JU

"Comparative

Implied

Indemnity"

and

"Contribution"

are

different principles.
Norton argues that "comparative applied indemnity" is merely
"contribution".

Norton tries throughout its brief to equate all

NSI's causes of action to "contribution".

In fact, rather than

cite a single case on contribution, Norton instead quotes Black's
Law Dictionary defining "contribution".

Norton attempts a game of

semantics. "Indemnity" was adopted by this court in the
case for product liability cases such as this one.
from contribution.

It is distinct

Norton raises no question that indemnity still

exists in Utah today.
indemnity

Hanover

This court should simply update Utah's

law to reflect

the legislative

intent, passed

since

indemnity was adopted, that no party should pay more than its
proportionate

share.

The

current

indemnity

law

violates

that

intent.
While different courts have used slightly different words to
describe "comparative implied indemnity", all those courts obtain
substantial justice by having each party bear its own proportionate
share of fault.

Norton's broad reading of "contribution" is not

even supported by its own definition.

8

The very next sentence in

Black's makes clear that contribution is recovered ". . . from
other joint

tort-feasors

. . ."

Indemnity

is different

from

"contribution," and implied indemnity, adopted by this court in
Hanover,

is not barred by the Tort Reform Statute.

"Comparative implied indemnity" has been adopted under similar
circumstances by many courts.
v. City

of

Sawyer,

use

the

appellate court

{Kennedy

608 P. 2d 1379, 1386) notes seven such courts

over fifteen years ago.
courts

The Kennedy

term

Norton is correct that some of these

"contribution"

"comparative implied indemnity."

in

their

discussion

of

But many of those states still

had (or even have) contribution because they have joint and several
liability.

One example

comparative

implied

Superior

Court,

578

is the California
American

indemnity,
P. 2d

899

case which

Motorcycle

(Ca. 1978) .

That

adopted

Ass'n
case

v.

adopted

comparative principles in indemnity cases, but left in place joint
and several liability.

Norton tries to focus on small differences,

while it ignores the large similarities.

The fact that one state

retained joint and several liability, and thus still uses the term
"contribution," does not mean that "comparative implied indemnity"
is the same as contribution.

9

In fact, contractual indemnity (Hanover
contract

implied

in law, see Hanover,

states that it is a

p 445)

is

specifically

exempted from the Tort Reform Statute in Utah Code Anno. §78-27-43
("Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs
any

right

to

indemnity

or

contribution

contract, or agreement.")Implied

arising

from

statute,

indemnity was not contribution

before the Tort Reform Statute, it does not become contribution now
by

adopting

a

comparative

fault

rationale

to

mirror

the

legislature's intent.
B.

An indemnity suit may be brought in a second, separate suit.
Norton points out that the Kansas Supreme court in Kennedy

City

of

Sawyer,

vs.

618 P.2d 788 (Kansas 1980) was an apportionment

between defendants in the original suit, not in a later action
(although Norton says it can "only" occur then, while the very next
sentence after Norton's quote sometimes allows a second suit).
However, this is for a very good reason which Norton omits to
mention.

First, it is the explicit law in Kansas.

It should also

be noted that Kansas has a different rule of civil procedure.
Unlike the Federal and Utah's rules, Kansas specifically requires
that cross-claims between defendants in tort cases are "compul-

10

sory."

K.S.A.

60-213(g)

against co-party."
Kansas

even

entitled

"Compulsory

cross-claim

Utah has a rule like Kansas' section (h), which

titles

(emphasis added).

is

"Permissive

cross-claim

against

co-party"

Norton's lengthy argument is fallacious because

Utah's rules of civil procedure are different and clearly make
cross-claims permissive.
C.

"Comparative

implied

indemnity"

reflects

the

principles

underlying the Tort Reform Act and Hanover.
NSI requests indemnity in the present suit.

It is possible

that NSI could decide to pursue only indemnity in this case (or
other parties many pursue only indemnity in future cases).

The

intent of the legislature is clear that all parties must pay their
own proportionate fault.
this court in the Hanover
Co.,

Traditional implied indemnity, adopted by
case (Hanover,

Ltd.

v.

Cessna

Aircraft

758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1988)) should be updated, following

numerous other courts, to do substantial justice as directed by our
own

legislative

branch.

NSI

does

not

care

what

particular

terminology this court decides to apply to such a fair outcome
dictated by the statute.

But "comparative implied indemnity", is

a term used by other courts which achieves that fairness and walks

11

hand in hand with the statute.

It is not ''contribution," which

even Norton acknowledges is based on joint and several liability,
and does not contradict the statute.
Norton argues "If there is any inequity in this scheme it is
an

inequity

address

which

the

legislature,

. . . ." Norton Brief

not

at 22.

this

This

court,

statement

must
is an

admission of the inequity inherent in this case and inherent in
pure implied indemnity.

Norton claims this court is powerless to

correct it but that claim is false.
by this very court in the Hanover
adopted by the legislature.

Implied indemnity was adopted

case.

Implied indemnity was not

This court clearly has the power to

adopt a "comparative" type of indemnity, particularly after the
legislature has indicated its specific intent for each party to pay
its proportionate share.
Hanover

stated that "The major purpose of strict liability is

to place the loss caused by a defective product on those who create
the risk

. . ." Hanover

accomplishes this.

at 446.

Comparative implied indemnity

This court should remand this case for the

indemnity cause of action to be heard, and should further adopt
"comparative implied indemnity" so that the lower court will apply

12

the principles the legislature adopted in the tort reform, and this
Court expressed in

Hanover.

DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
PROPORTIONATE FAULT AND REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS
POINT III:

THE TORT REFORM STATUTE SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS CODEFENDANTS TO HAVE EACH OTHER'S PROPORTIONATE FAULT
DETERMINED.

It is elementary statutory interpretation that statutes must
be read as a whole.

Norton focuses on one short sentence barring

"contribution",

argues

actions

are

and

simply

from

that

"contribution"

sentence

actions

that

all

"renamed."

NSI's
Norton

ignores the remainder of the statute and the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Norton's reading of this statute is narrow and unacceptable.
This

statute

specifically

authorizes

"reimbursement" as NSI has done here.

a

party

to

seek

Norton itself acknowledges

that the statute allows a cross-claim between two defendants to
have each other's proportionate fault determined.

In fact, the

former appellate court acknowledged in this very case that such a
cross-claim

exists.

"However,

13

NSI

could

have

protected

its

potential claim against Norton by filing a cross-claim against
Packer

Norton under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f)"

at 1278.

The issue then, is not whether a cross-claim exists
clearly does.

- it

The issue is when can a cross-claim be brought?

Must it be brought in an initial suit between two co-defendants, or
may it be brought in an independent suit?

Norton argues that a

second suit is "contribution," and therefore banned.

In fact,

nowhere does Norton cite any authority for its argument.
POINT IV: CROSS-CLAIMS ARE NEVER COMPULSORY,
Norton does not cite any authority that even suggests that an
allowable cross claim is mandatory, and is waived if not filed in
an original suit.

Norton does not discuss Utah Rule of Civil

Procedure 13(f), which makes cross claims permissive, nor any of
the numerous authorities NSI cited in its original brief.
Pages

14-19

in NSI's

original

brief

cited

reasons why cross-claims are not compulsory.
contrary authority.

As the Augustin

authority

and

Norton cites no

case summarizes u . . . a party

to an action having a claim in the nature of a cross-claim has the
option to pursue it in an independent action."
521 F.2d 1215, 1216 (8th Cir. 1975).

14

Augustin

v.

Mughal,

Norton ignores the numerous policy reasons behind cross-claims
being permissive.

Among the reasons are that co-defendants have a

say in the choice of the form and the timing of the litigation.
Likewise Norton totally ignores, as Wright Miller and Kane Federal
Practice and Procedure

, Section 1431 states, "a party who

decides not to bring this claim under Rule 13(g) (Utah's 13(f) will
not be barred by res judicata,

waiver, or estoppel from asserting

in a later action . . . " ) .

Norton ignores that if there is no

right of one defendant to have another defendant's proportionate
fault determined now, then there is no such right to cross-claim in
the original suit.

That exists now.

Substantive law, here the

Utah Tort Reform Statute, determines whether a right between such
co-defendants exists.

If it does not exist, no cross claim can

ever be filed between defendants.

If it does exist, the cross

claim may be brought in an independent action, such as this one.
POINT V.

DUPLICATIVE SUITS

Norton expresses the law's concern about duplicative suits.
There is an entire body of law, that of res
prevent duplicate suits.

judicata,

which will

Both before and after the Tort Reform

Statute, if two defendants "fully and fairly litigated" the issues

15

between them, they cannot relitigate them later.

Both before and

after the Tort Reform Statute the rules of civil procedure, clearly
allow parties to litigate any right which the statute gives them.
Co-defendants generally have the same incentive to resolve all
causes

of

action

in

an

initial

suit.

However,

in

unusual

circumstances, such as occurred here, NSI's claim that Norton's
fault should be determined can be brought later.

Norton's fault

has yet to be litigated.
CONCLUSION
The lower court wrongly dismissed the claims to have Norton's
proportionate fault determined.
fault be determined.
statute.

NSI simply requests that Norton's

This is fair, equitable, and allowed by this

Norton's brief hinges on a narrow reading of the statute,

ignoring the rules of civil procedure, and ignoring the case law
and commentators.

Black's Law Dictionary is the most authoritative

citation found by Norton. Even Black's defines "contribution" as
dealing with the old joint and several liability language.
not applicable here.
of State vs. Taylor,

It is

It is telling that Norton (with the exception
818 P. 2d 561

(Utah App. 1991) holding the

appellate court should review the trial court's conclusion for

16

correctness) does not cite a single case which was not used in
NSI's original brief supporting its arguments.
Norton cites no case suggesting the rules of civil procedure
can be ignored, and cross-claims made compulsory based on a broad
reading of the word "contribution" in the statute.

Norton cites no

case even suggesting that a cause of action for proportionate fault
can exist in an original case between two defendants, but somehow
vanishes later.

Norton cites not one rule of civil procedure nor

even discusses them.

Norton cites no commentator who would lend

any support on Norton's claim that NSI had a compulsory cross-claim
that has now been negated by not being filed in the original suit.
Norton not even cites a case defining contribution in the broad
manner which it suggest it should apply.
Norton's brief inasmuch as acknowledges that an injustice has
been done in this case, but claims the legislature, and not this
court is responsible, and only the legislature can correct it.
That is simply not the case. The Tort Reform Act allows a crossclaim for one defendant to have another defendant's proportion of
fault determined.

The prior appellate court so stated.

Norton

itself acknowledges that an indemnity suit can be brought against

17

co-defendant

International.

authorized by the statute.

"Reimbursement"

is

specifically

NSI is suing for that reimbursement -

for a reasonable settlement which courts encourage.

Utah Rule of

Civil Procedure 13 (f) allows the cause of action to be brought in
an independent action.

The dismissal of the claims under the Tort

Reform Statute for failure to state a claim was in error.
The summary judgment was also in error.

The indemnity claims

were never litigated between these two parties, and are not barred
by res

judicata.

claims

must

No cross-claim was even filed.
also

be

remanded,

and

this

court

The indemnity
should

adopt

comparative implied indemnity to reflect the fairness underlying
the Tort Reform Statute and the Hanover

case.

Remanding this case will result in fairness and justice not
only in this case but others to follow.
fault must be determined.

Norton's proportionate

Norton must pay the damages which its

fault caused.

18

DATED this

f

day of December, 1996
POWELL & LANG, LC

Wade\^. Wijrfegar
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of December, 1996 I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

Paul M. Belnap
Robert L. Janicki
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for the defendant/appellee
B.W. Norton Manufacturing
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM 1
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Todd S. Winegar, 3521
Wade S. Winegar, 5561
POWELL & LANG
Attorneys for Plaintiff National
Service Industries, Inc.
110 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)364-0412

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
NATIONAL SERVICE,
INDUSTRIES, INC.

:
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. NOEL DE NEVERS

Plaintiff,
»

vs.
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a California
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL)
MACHINE & TOOL WORKS, INC.,
an Illinois corporation,

:

Civil No. 950900951CV

:

Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Defendants.
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Dr. Noel de Nevers, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

1. I have personal knowledge of all facts stated in this affidavit.
2. I conducted certain tests on a metal pail manufactured by B.W. Norton Manufacturing in
the Packer v, NSI case.
3.1 conducted tests to determine if a pressure build up could occur in these metal pails, what
would happen when they were opened and the cause of the pressure.
4. I tested a can from the same product batch, similar to the one that injured the plaintiff, and
I determined a pressure buildup had in fact occurred in the can.
5. There are three potential causes for this pressure: 1) a chemical reaction involving the
contents of the container; 2) a change in temperature from when the container was sealed to when
it was opened; or 3) a change in altitude from where the container was sealed to where it was opened.
6. I tested the gas space ("head space") inside the subject container, and found it contained
only nitrogen and oxygen, mostly in the same proportions as they exist in atmospheric air. There
was no indication of any gases produced by a chemical reaction inside the container.
7. 1 made no tests of the pressure change caused by increasing the temperature of the
container and its contents. However, an increase in that temperature would certainly cause an
increase in container pressure.
8. Transporting the pail from sea level to the altitude of the Wasatch Front would create
approximately 2.2 psi of pressure within the pail. That pressure would propel the cap at a speed of
approximately 30 to 160 miles per hour.

2

9. The build up of pressure that caused the cap to be propelled upwards in the Packer v. NSI
case was due to a change in altitude and temperature and not due to a chemical reaction.
10. There was no pressure relief feature built into the Norton pail to relieve this pressure that
occurs with a change in altitude.
11. Because the pressure build up was from altitude and temperature changes, and not from
a chemical reaction, a similar explosion of the cap would occur regardless of the contents of the
container, or even if the container contained only air.
I say "similar" because the calculations of the speed of the seal in this affidavit are based on
altitude only. The temperature rise would increase the explosive speed of the seal, but I have not yet
determined how much of an increase temperature would make. This increase due to temperature
may differ between liquids.
12. It is my opinion that a container which allows the seal to be propelled at these speeds
because of normal altitude and temperature differences which regularly occur during normal
shipping is unreasonably dangerous.
DATED this ' ^ d a y of September, 1995.

NOELDENEVERS
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STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
}
lis '-13^
Subscribed to before me this
' day of September, 1995
, mm mm mm mm mm mm mm m*

Notary PuNle
^RISTI£ J. PERRY
878R«tAwn?2
SflUUtoCjVsUt* 84103

•
I
|
J

NOTARY PUBLJC7
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/'^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of September, 1995, a true and accurate copy of the

Affidavit of Dr. Noel de Nevers was mailed to the following:

Paul M. Belnap
Robert L. Janicki
STRONG &HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant B.W. Norton Manufacturing
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Pamela K. McDermaid
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